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INTRODUCTION
In the traditional analysis of antitrust matters in the United States,
the primary focus is on deterring one party (or a combination of
parties) from obtaining a dominant or monopolistic position with
respect to the exercise of market power' in the subject relevant mar-
ket. 2 In assessing whether such market power exists, American antitrust
* Mr. Curtin is a partner middle chairman of the litigation dcparuncnt at Bingham Dana
LLP. 13.A., 1954 Boston College, J.D., 1957 Boston College Law School, L.L.M., 1959 Georgetown
Law School.
5 * Mr. Goldberg is a partner in the litigation department at Bingham Dana LLP and heads
its Antitrust, Distribution and Franchise Group. BA., 1968 Trinity College, ID., 1971 Harvard
Law School.
*** Mr. Savrin is a partner in the litigation department at Bingham Dana LLP and practices
with the Antitrust, Distribution and Franchise Group. BA., 1984 Union College, J.D„ 1989
University of Virginia School of Law.
The authors wish to thank Alicia L. Downey, James E. O'Connell Ill, Sheila H. Connolly,
Kevin Hall and Carolyn Trask for their assistance in researching and editing this article.
1 Market power is a comprehensive concept which refers to the ability of a party to exercise
economic control over other actors within a given market, A more precise definition of market
power is difficult to develop outside of a given context. Market power has been defined as "the
ability of a firm to increase its profits by reducing output and charging more than a competitive
price for its product," "the power to control prices," and "the power to raise prices without losing
SO many sales that the price increase is unprofitable." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 3.1 (1985).
' The identification and definition of a relevant market is a critical clement of antitrust
analysis. The definition of a relevant market precedes the determination of an assessment of
whether undue market power can be exercised. As the 1992 U.S. Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines note, "fal merger is unlikely to create
or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise unless it significantly increases concentration
and results in a concentrated market, properly defined and measured." 1992 U.S. Department
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laws traditionally have been interpreted as protecting competition with
reference to the impact of the exercise of market power on the con-
sumer and competitors. In that vein, in assessing both horizontal and
vertical restraints, 3 enforcement authorities have focused on the impli-
cations of the proposed merger—or subject practice—on the cost the
consumer pays for products or the ability of actual (or new entry)
competitors to compete effectively in the marketplace.
As market dynamics change, the definition of relevant markets, as
well as the determination of what constitutes the exercise of market
power, must change. U.S. antitrust laWs, as interpreted and enforced,
however, have not yet accounted for certain changes that have taken
place in the domestic retail marketplace. In contrast, the Commis-
sion of the European Communities ("EC"), 4 in assessing the proposed
mer-ger of two Finnish supermarket firms—Kcsko Oy ("Kesko") and
Tuko Oy ("Tuko")—has recently recognized certain significant devel-
opments in the nature of the relationship between suppliers and large
retailers. It also acknowledged the importance of accounting for the
of justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION: PRIMARY SOURCE PAMPHLET 109 § 1.0 (2d ed. 1997) thereinafter 1992
Guidelines].
In that context, the 1992 Guidelines state that
[a] market is defined as a product or group of products in a geographic area in
which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit maximizing firm, not
subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller
of those products in that area, likely would impose at least a "small but significant
and non-transitory" increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other
products are held constant. A relevant market is a group of products and geo-
graphic area that is no bigger than necessary to satisfy the test.
Id.
3
 Market restraints generally either take the horizontal or vertical form. Horizontal restraints
involve an agreement among competitors to exercise market power within the same tier in the
market (e.g., manufacturers colluding with other manufacturers). Vertical restraints involve busi-
nesses that operate at different levels of distribution within the market jointly exercising market
power (e.g., a manufacturer 'colluding with a retailer). See generally JULIAN VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §§ 11.01, 13.01, 18.01 (1998) [hereinafter ANTITRUST
Laws].
4 The Commission on the European Communities ("EC") was embryonically formed in 1951
as a result of the Treaty of Paris. In general, the EC's function is to monitor and manage the
economic union between the participant European countries. In terms of the merger regulations,
the EC is responsible for controlling restrictive business practices and prohibiting abuses of
dominant market power. See WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
§§ 16.2-16.4 (1996). The EC is comprised of representatives from a number of European union
countries. The EC has three primary functions. Among its functions is the responsibility to act
as a guardian and enforcer of European Union treaties concerning competition policy. In that
role, the EC has the responsibility as it did here, to oversee and rule upon proposed merger
activity. For more information on the EC, see generally <http://ettropa.eu.int/com > (visited
Mar. 4, 1999).
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implications of these developments in its antitrust analysis of the pro-
posed merger.5 Indeed, these changes recognized by the EC are not
unique to Finland or the European market, rather, they reflect retailer
practices and dynamics which arc also prevalent in U.S. retail markets.
Like their EC counterparts, federal enforcement authorities should
address these changes in retailer market power while evaluating sus-
pect mergers and practices within these markets.
In evaluating the proposed Kesko/Tuko merger, the EC recog-
nized at the outset that, in assessing the potential emergence of a
powerful retailer, its definition of the relevant markets needed to
include the effect on the market for the retailer's procurement of daily
consumer goods—i.e., the effect of the merger on manufacturers and
suppliers as well as the effect on consumers and competitors!' This
recognition is significant, both because it (a) reflects a departure from
the traditional focus on consumer and competitor markets and (b) ac-
knowledges a fundamental change in the dynamic between the pow-
erful retailer and its suppliers. It also recognizes that the powerful
retailer in today's market wields extraordinary control over, at a mini-
mum, all but the largest and most prominent brand name product
suppliers.?
In analyzing the powerful retailer's potential exercise of market
power in the procurement market, the EC recognized that large retail-
ers perform a "gatekeeper" function by determining who has access to
both the procureinCnt and consumer marketplace' As a "gatekeeper,"
a retailer has the ability to exercise market power to determine the
extent of a producer's access to the retail marketplace and the terms
on which such access will be made available. This role affords large
retailers significant leverage over producers and suppliers. It also has
n The Kesko/Tuko decision has been appealed to the European Court of Justice (Case
T-134/97). The appeal is pending. A differing outcome in the Kesitoffuho appeal will not affect
the thesis of this Article as the retail market power problems recognized by the EC will continue
to develop in both Europe and the United States, and will require careful scrutiny by antitrust
and competition authorities. It is notable that the changes recognized by the EC in the Keskofrulto
decision also were recognized in The Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy,
Catalogue No. CR-00.96-742-xx-C (last visited Mar. 4, 1999) Chttp://etitopa.eu.int/en/connn/
dg04>,
(' The EC defined the "market for procurement of daily consumer goods" as involving "the
sale of daily consumer goods by producers of such goods to customers such as wholesalers,
retailers and other enterprises." See Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M. 784, Kesko/Tuko, 1997
O.J. (L 110), 53, 57-58, VI 33-35. The analysis of the market, the EC found, involved an
assessment of the impact of the "increased buying power" of the combined Kesko/Tuko entity.
See id.
7 See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text,
9 See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
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cognizable implications for the consumer market, given the vertical
integration between the markets.' The EC also recognized that the
emergence of private label marketing by large retailersm creates further
avenues for the enhanced exercise of market power because of the
retailer's dual role as customer and competitor in both the procure-
ment and consumer markets. Although the elements of powerful re-
tailer dynamics which the EC noted in the Kesko/Tuko decision have
been present for some time, the recognition of their existence and
implications for antitrust analysis of retailer mergers and ongoing
practices is a significant development.
In the United States, with the continuing consolidation of the
food retail markets and the persistent growth of dominant mass mer-
chandise retailers, the issues identified by the EC in Kesko/Tuko war-
rant serious consideration." Wal-Mart, for example, has emerged over
the last several years as one of the nation's largest grocers and, al-
though the top five U.S. grocery retailers account for about twenty
percent of the overall market, there has been significant growth in
concentration in regional grocery retail markets. 12 This concentration
has created a dynamic which affects both the consumer and supply
markets." Notably, even first-tier and recognized brand manufacturers
have become dependent upon dominant retailers whose decisions
affect both their operations and viability."
The EC's acknowledgement of these changing dynamics in the
Kesko/Tuko decision should encourage U.S. antitrust enforcement
authorities to re-evaluate their current modes of analysis. In re Toys -R-
9 Thc term "vertical integration" refers to the manner in which market power can be exer-
cised at varying levels of the market (i.e., the combined Kesko/Tuko entity could exercise market
power at both the supply and retail markets). See JuLtAs VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION: DESK EDITION § 4.05[6] (1998) [hereinafter DESK EDITION],
I ° Private label marketing refers to the practice by retailers of manufacturing or distributing
products with a store brand or other "private labels." See Plum? FITZELL, PRIVATE LABEL MAR-
KETING IN •UE 1990's (1992); More Shoppers Bypass Big Name Brands and Steer Carts to Private
Label Products, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1992, at RI. These private label products are in direct
competition with the brand-name products that retailers might otherwise stock. See Kesko/Tuko,
supra note 6, at 67-68, ¶1 106-10; see also infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
"While the growth of large dominant retailers across a variety of markets is a developing
phenomenon in the United States, this Article will focus on the increasing concentration in the
food retail and mass merchandise markets. These markets were selected as exemplars for analysis
both because they parallel the markets the EC was analyzing in Kesko/Tuko and because of the
rapid and apparent nature of consolidation in these markets.
Similarly, given that the Kesko/Tuko decision arose in a merger context, this Article will
primarily focus on a comparison to the U.S, treatment of retailer power in the merger context.
12 See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
IS See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
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Us; discussed in this Article, is a strong first step in this direction.° U.S.
antitrust enforcement authorities, as well as legislators, also must en-
deavor to examine closely the exercise of the existing large retailers'
power in the procurement market, the implications of their emerging
"gatekeeper" function in and private label competitor status.
Absent this examination, the increasing consolidation in the retail
marketplace, coupled with the growth of supercenters like Wal-Mart,
creates the genuine possibility that powerful retailers will widely exer-
cise market power to constrain and control the supply market while,
at the same time, exercising significant control over consumer options
and costs. Although this situation may not be perceived as alarming in
the current market dynamic, the potential for dominance arid monop-
olization in both marketplaces is significant, should the growth of
powerful retailers continue unabated. The decision by the • EC in
Kesko/Tuko clearly depicts how these problems develop and why they
warrant attention by U.S. antitrust regulators before they result in
concentrated market power for dominant retailers.
The Introduction of this Article examines the EC's recognition of
the emerging market power by powerful retailers over manufacturers
and suppliers with respect to the procurement of consumer goods and
considers how U.S. antitrust authorities might likewise take account of
these factors in their analysis of mergers and other practices." Part I
of this Article examines the EC's decision in the Kesko/Tuko matter,
particularly its recognition of (a) the existence of a relevant antitrust
market for the procurement of consumer goods, (b) the "gatekeeper"
function of these retailers and (c) the ability of dominant retailers to
use the marketing of private label products to compete both in price
and information—notably information with respect to consumer be-
havior and competitors' marketing strategies.'" Part II describes the
manner in which retailer mergers and practices traditionally have been
examined under U.S. antitrust law principles.'" Part III examines the
changing marketplace dynamics in the U.S. market for food and mass
15 See In re Toys-R-Us, Inc., Final Order, Opinion of Commission, F.T.C, No. 9278, at 5 (Oct.
13, 1998), available in <http://www. ftc.gov/a3/1998/9810/toyrsittorcl.hun > (visited Mar. 4,
1999). In Toys-l?-0, the FTC found, inter alit; that Toys-R•Us ("TRU"), which had a significant
but not monopolistic or monopsonistic market share in the toy market, exercised its market power
to cause suppliers to treat certain competitors of TRU in a discriminatory fashion. This decision
is discussed at infra notes 124-39 and accompanying text,
1 " See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
IR See infra notes 22-50 and accompanying text.
19
 See infra notes 51-1S9 and accompanying text.
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merchandise retailers." In particular, it focuses on changing market-
place dynamics in those U.S. markets which are developing in a similar
fashion to those recognized by the EC in the Kesko/Tuko decision.
Finally, the Conclusion suggests that appropriate development and
assessment of U.S. antitrust law enforcement is warranted so that these
matters can be addressed prospectively. 2 ' Failure to examine these
matters now will burden U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities by
requiring them to address the "gatekeeper" function and private label
advantages of dominant retailers only after they have become firmly
entrenched.
I. THE &SRO/MK° DECISION: RECOGNIZING CHANGES IN THE
RETAIL MARKET DYNAMIC AND),THE EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER BY
POWERFUL RETAILERS
The May 1996 merger announcement of two Finnish food retail-
ers, Tuko and Kesko, led to a watershed event in the analysis of retailer
market power. In November 1996, the EC determined that the concen-
tration of the Finnish market that would have been created by the
acquisition of Tuko, a supermarket enterprise, by Kesko, a competing
supermarket, was incompatible with the merger regulations of the
common market concerning concentration of control." In so holding,
the EC analyzed the merger's antitrust implications in the traditional
manner—i.e., from the perspective of the consumers and competitors
of the merging entities. The EC, however, also analyzed the implica-
tions of the merger from a new perspective—that of the manufacturers
who supplied goods to the merging entities. Ultimately, the develop-
ments in antitrust analysis, as reflected in the EC decision, have wide-
ranging implications for both European and U.S. entities.
A. A Relevant Antitrust Market for the Procurement of Consumer Goods
On May 27, 1996, Kesko, a Finnish company that operates super-
markets selling consumer and specialty goods, acquired a majority of
the shares of Tuko, a Finnish company that operates supermarkets also
selling consumer and specialty goods, and also sells wholesale goods. 23
2° See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
22 See Kesko/Tuko, supra note 6, at 76, I 179. As noted, the Decision has been appealecrto
the European Court of Justice. See id. (appeal docketed, Case T-134/97 (E.C.J.)). The regulation
at issue was Regulation EEC 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings.
See id. at 53, '11 1.
23 Id. at 53-54, II 3-7. In terms of market share, it was estimated that a combined
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When it undertook its analysis, the EC identified markets in which the
merger could potentially have the most significant impact. The EC
analyzed the retail market for daily consumer goods from both the
traditional perspective of consumer protection and restriction of mar-
ket power vis-à-vis competitors. The novel element of its analysis in-
volved the market for procurement of daily consumer goods. Under
this analysis, the EC focused on the implications of (a) the merger for
access by suppliers to the marketplace and (b) the private label opera-
tions of Kesko and Tuko for their exercise of market power with respect
to their suppliers.
In defining the relevant product market for "procurement of daily
consumer goods," the EC noted that such markets involve "the sale of
daily consumer goods by producers of these goods to customers such
as wholesalers, retailers, arid other enterprises."" In assessing the prod-
uct market, the EC noted that "from the demand side, corporate
customers such as large supermarket chains will probably attempt to
obtain the best possible conditions for their purchases of individual
products."25 It was not necessary to assess the market on an individual
product basis because "the impact of the increased buying power
brought about by the new demand structure" would be spread across
the whole range of daily consumer goods. 26 Further, although the EC
acknowledged that distribution channels other than supermarkets ex-
isted for producers of non-food items, it concluded that these were not
significant alternatives and therefore, should not affect its assessment
of the proposed supermarket merger."
The EC determined that the merger could seriously harm suppli-
ers of the emerging powerful retailer. The EC acknowledged that the
position that a combined Kesko/Tuko would have in the retail market
for consumer goods would create a dominant position for the com-
bined entities in the procurement markets. 25 Conversely, the EC noted
Kesko/Tuko would account for at least 55% of all retail sales of daily consumer goods in Finland.
Id. at 71, 1 136.
241d. 11 33 .
25 /61. 1 34
26 Id.
27 See Keskofruko, supra note 6, at 58, 1 85.
28 See id. 1 38 (finding that the position in the procurement market afforded the combined
entity with market power vis-a-vis suppliers of the daily consumer goods). The EC commonly
defined dominance as constituting "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking
which enables it to prevent effective competition . . . by giving it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers."
Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 277, 11978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 486-87
(1978).
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that, since the procurement and retail markets were "vertically inter-
connected,"29 the merged entity's position at the procurement level
would significantly affect its competitive advantage at the retail level."
Effectively, the EC found that the merged entity's market power ex-
panded their control over both customers and suppliers.
I. The "Gatekeeper" Function of Dominant Retailers
With respect to the advantages that would be realized from in-
creased buying power, the EC acknowledged that, following the acqui-
sition of Tuko, a supplier would have to deal with Kesko in order to
get access to Finnish supermarkets. This would create a "unique pur-
chasing power in the hands of Kesko." 31 In essence, the EC noted that
Kesko, as a dominant retailer, would perform a "gatekeeper" function
in the entire Finnish marketplace."
As the "gatekeeper," the post-merger entity would have the ability
to exercise market power to determine the extent of a producer's
access to the retail marketplace as well as the terms on which such ac-
cess could be obtained." This "gatekeeper" effect, the EC stated, would
"be further increased by the combination of the successful Kcsko and
Tuko private label products, which could be used as a further negoti-
ating tool, vis-a-vis suppliers, to achieve additional concessions on, inter
alia, reduced prices or increased marketing support." 34 Kesko's in-
creased purchasing power and "ability to obtain lower prices from
producers," the EC recognized, would also serve as a barrier to entry
and allow Kcsko to act "to a significant extent" independently of its
competitors in the retail market. 35 The increased market power over
procurement was found to create both an unfair advantage for Kesko
and barriers to Kesko's competitors' ability to actively compete against
Kesko."
The EC's recognition of the implications of the proposed transac-
tion from an antitrust perspective went far beyond the traditional
29
 Kesko/Tuko, supra note 6, at 58,1 38.
39 Id,
31 Id. at 71,1 133,
32 Id. The EC concluded that Kesko's dominance of the retail distribution channels "guaran-
tees Kesko an extremely powerful negotiating position vis-à-vis the producers of daily consumer
goods." Id. at 72-73,1 146.
33 See id. at 71,11 133-35.
34 Id.1 133.
Kesko/Tuko, supra note 6, at 71,11 134-35.
36 See id.
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analysis of market implications for competitors and consumers. View-
ing the transaction from the suppliers' perspective, the EC found
that the majority of suppliers, including multi-national enterprises,
depended on Kesko and Tuko for sales in Finland." Analyzing this
finding, the EC stated that "the dependency of different suppliers will
differ according to the nature and size of the business and consumer
perception regarding their products."38 With the exception of very
large producers of high name-recognition products, who might have
some countervailing market power, the EC concluded that small- and
medium-sized producers and suppliers would be dependent upon
Kcsko/Tuko and would need to maintain their sales through
Kesko/Tuko." In contrast, Kesko/Tuko, as a powerful retailer, would
not be dependent on any individual supplier to the same extent. 1° For
any one product group, the EC acknowledged, Kcsko would normally
be able to switch from one supplier to. another. The producers, in
contrast, would not have a similar ability to switch to alternative retail-
ers, since no alternative retailers would have the capacity or access to
the consumer that would match the producers' or suppliers' current
production capacity.'"
2. The Ability of a Dominant Retailer to Use Private Label Products
to Compete and to Exercise Market Power
The EC observed that certain developments in the retail market-
place have created a dynamic that will enhance the buying power of
larger retail entities, including the proposed Kcsko/Tuko merged en-
tity.4i In particular, the EC noted that the development of private label
products is "a key element. in the power wielded by retailers vis-à-vis
branded daily consumer-goods producers.""
57 See id. at 73, 1 150.
11 Id.; see also Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 5,1 233.
"See Kesko/Tuko, supra note 6, at 73, 1 150.
"See id. 1 151.
41 See id. While there is no question that a manufacturer has no specific tight to retail
distribution of its products, the significant point made in Kesko/Tuko is the case with which a
powerful retailer can eliminate a manufacturer's access to consumers. The powerful retailer
effectively governs access by manufacturers to a particular segment of consumers (and, likewise,
the consumers' access to that manufacturers' products) and thus is able to deny the manufactur-
ers access to that segment of the consumer population. It is this ability of the powerful retailer
that warrants a recognition by antitrust enforcement authorities of the reality that criteria and
dynamics different from the traditional analyses apply.to the evaluation of market power by large
retailers.
42 Id. 1 152.
Kesko/Tuko, supra note 6, at 73, 1 152. The EC also noted that both Kesko and Tuko,
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The "private labeling" practice by large retailers gives them an
advantage over their suppliers, competitors and customers. The power
the EC identified as created by private label products—with respect to
pricing, access to consumer behavior and competitor marketing infor-
mation—is profound. Private label products, the EC found, afford
powerful retailers "the ability to price a greater proportion of its sales
without having the need to take into account the reaction of its com-
petitors in the same way as with branded products."" The development
of private label brands by large retailers, the EC also noted, "enables
retailers, who are inevitably privy to commercially sensitive details re-
garding the branded goods producers' product launches and promo-
tional strategies, to act as competitors, as well as key customers of the
producers. This privileged position increases the.leverage enjoyed by
retailers over branded-goods producers."" The EC also found that
power retailers' direct access to information about consumers' prefer-
ences—thereby enabling targeted advertising and marketing to indi-
vidual consumers—also enhances such retailers' position of power over
branded-goods producers. This access to specific consumer behavior
information, which is not generally available to producers, the EC
found, "will enhance their negotiating power vis-d-vis producers, who
do not enjoy the same immediate access to information on consumer
behaviour.""
The EC concluded that the increased buying power of Kcsko/
Tuko, enhanced by the private label leverage that they would have over
suppliers, would reinforce the post-merger entity's dominant position
in the retail marketplace. In addition to creating leverage over suppli-
ers, the EC noted, Kesko/Tuko would have, by virtue of its buying
power, the ability to employ different strategies. The long-term effects
of these strategies would weaken the position of its competitors and
increase its market power, vis-à-vis the competitors and the consumer,
as well as producers and suppliers. 47 Moreover, the EC found that the
enhanced "gatekeeper" effect, coupled with private labeling, is likely
to foreclose the entry of new competitors into the retail market. In
pre-merger, according to brand name producers, used their private label products as negotiation
tools, See id. at 70, 7 129.
44 1d. at 70, 1 130.
45 1d.
46 1d. at 73, 7 152.
47 See id. at 74, 1 153. The marketing of private label products may also cause the disappear-
ance of less prominent brand manufacturers which would limit choice and create opportunities
for the large retailers to increase consumer costs.
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assessing the potential for competition to enter the marketplace, the
EC noted that there had not been "new entry to any of the markets
discussed," and that the likely cause was that Kcsko (even before the
acquisition of Tuko) enjoyed a strong buying position "as the most
important customer of the majority of all producers of daily consumer
goods."48 The post-merger increase in Kesko's buying power, the EC
found, would constitute one of the most significant barriers to entry,
because one of the key questions for any potential entrant would be
its ability to secure access to consumer goods at prices that would
permit effective competition with the dominant entity: 19 The EC found
that Kcsko/Tuko had the ability to exert market power over the pro-
curement marketplace, with significant repercussions for consumers
and competitors. This market power in the procurement marketplace,
the EC concluded, was one of the "most significant barriers" to poten-
tial competitors' entry into the market?'
The market power that dominant retailers exercise over suppliers,
consumers and competitors which the EC recognized in Kesko/Tuko is
significant to the evaluation of the conduct of dominant retailers and
retailer mergers and practices. The lessons from the EC's recognition
of these evolving areas of market power arc of particular importance,
given the developing market concentration among retailers. These
lessons are ones which, as discussed in the following sections of this
Article, should be heeded by U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities.
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ASSESSMENT OF RETAILER
MERGERS AND PRACTICES UNDER TRADITIONAL U.S. ANTURUST LAW
PRINCIPLES
The antitrust laws in the United States grow out of a profound
preference for the operation of a free market as opposed to govern-
ment regulation of the marketplace.5 ' The philosophy of the antitrust
laws assumes that desirable results will be achieved in the free market,
except in instances where an individual party can obtain significant
market power that would allow it to operate unchecked by general,
free market restraints. 52 The principal federal statutes concerning the
enforcement of antitrust laws with respect to merger activities—the
1" Kesko/Tuko, supra note 5, 1 154.
4° See id. 1 158.
5° Id,
51 See VON KALINOWSKI, DESK EDITION, supra 1101C 9, § 1.01.
"See id.
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Sherman Act" and the Clayton Act54—reflect the preference for less
government involvement in the marketplace.
A. The Sherman and Clayton Acts
The Sherman Act, stating in pertinent part that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal," prohibits various forms of
agreements designed to restrain trade as well as efforts to monopolize
a portion of the market by a single entity." In broad terms, under the
Sherman Act, a company engages in illegal monopolization when it
has monopoly power—which is the power to control prices or to
exclude competition—and that power has been unfairly obtained or is
being used unfairly."
The Clayton Act embodies the same philosophy as the Sherman
Act, but bestows upon the relevant enforcement agencies 57 the ability
to enforce the antitrust laws both on a prospective and retrospective
basis." It states in pertinent part that
[n]o person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any pan. of the stock or other share capital and no person
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any parts of the assets of another
person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce, in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly. 59
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994). The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 came about largely as
a result of concerns about mass industrialization in the late 19th century and the increasing power
of corporate entities and trusts. For a more detailed discussion on the Sherman Act, see VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note a, § 9.02.
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 18-9 (1994). The passage of the Clayton Act in 1914 was largely the result
of the Congress's concerns about the Sherman Act's inability to deal with particular forms of
anticompetitive practices. See VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 3, § 9.03.
55
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
56 See United States v. Crinell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see also United States v. E.1.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
57 The enforcement agencies generally involved in antitrust matters are the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of justice, an executive branch agency, and the Federal Trade
Commission, an independent government organization. Enforcement of antitrust laws, as more
fully discussed infra, is also conducted by state attorneys general. Private enforcement of antitrust
laws, while an available option under U.S. antitrust laws, is not a focus of this Article.
55 See VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 3, § 9.03 [1] [b].
59 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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One prospective element of that enforcement is the review of busi-
ness mergers prior to their implementation.° To a considerable
degree, this review parallels the review undertaken by the EC with
respect to the Kesko/Tuko merger.
Properly implemented, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act
could effectively address changing dynamics in the retail marketplace.
They have not been utilized to that effect. At times, in the analysis of
retail mergers pursuant to the Sherman and/or Clayton Acts, the
Supreme Court has recognized the existence of retailer buying power,"
the potential for the exercise of market power by a retailer that also
functions as its own supplier 62 and the detrimental potential of undue
concentration in the grocery retail marketplace as situations that anti-
trust laws were meant to deter." Their valuable guidance warrants
further enhancement and assessment in light of the retail market
dynamics recognized by the EC in Kesko/Tuko and which arc impend-
ing realities in the U.S. market."
Other provisions of the Clayton Act address vertical restraints—
situations where a manufacturer or other entity higher up in the
distribution chain implements certain requirements or restrictions on
a retailer or other entity lower down in the distribution chain." This
6° See 15 U.S.C. §§ 18-19.
61 See, e.g., United Slates v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1947) (noting that although "fliarge-
scale buying is not, of course, unlawful per se .... may not, however, be used to monopolize
or to attempt to monopolize interstate trade or commerce. Nor ... may it be used to stifle
competition . . . ."). The Court also notes in Griffith that "size is of course an earmark of
monopoly power." a at 107, n.10.
62 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 301, 332-34 (1962) (noting that the
"necessary corollary" of the trends of acquiring manufacturers to become sources of supply for
acquired retailers "is the foreclosure of independent manufacturers from markets otherwise open
to them" and that the "trend toward vertical integration may foreclose competition").
63 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-79 (1966) (rejecting a merger
of two large grocery stores and noting that "Itlhe facts of this case present exactly the threatening
trend toward concentration Congress wanted to halt ... I t] his rapid decline in the number of
grocery store owners moved hand in hand with a large number of significant absorption of the
small companies by the larger ones."). The Supreme Court further noted that the Clayton Act
requires not merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon
competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in the
future .. • . It is enough for us that Congress feared that a market marked at the
same time by both a.continuous decline in the number of small businesses and a
large number of mergers would slowly but inevitably gravitate from a market of
many small competitors to one dominated by one or a few giants, and competition
would thereby be destroyed,
Id. at 278; see also ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION: PRIMARY SOURCE PAMI'IILET, supra
note 2, at 109.
64 See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text,
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994). Analytically, the Clayton Act approaches vertical restraints from
the perspective that the manufacturer or supplier has the facility to exercise market, power over
its retailer or dealer. See also Moore v. Jas. I I. Matthew's Sc Co„ 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977)
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Article will primarily address U.S. horizontal merger guidelines be-
cause they closely parallel the EC merger regulation standards at issue
in the Kesko/Tuko opinion. It is noteworthy, however, that the tradi-
tional contemplation of vertical restraints as involving an entity higher
up in the distribution chain exercising market power over an entity
lower in the distribution chain is inverted somewhat by the Kesko/Tuko
analysis. The EC in the Kesko/Tuko opinion recognized that entities
lower in the distribution chain can and do engage in restraints on
competition with respect to entities higher in the distribution chain.
B, The Robinson-Patman Act
A third antitrust enactment, the Robinson-Pannan Act," was a
response to the rise of supermarket chains and their ability to exercise
greater buying power (relative to suppliers), to the detriment of small,
local retailers. It states in part that
Mt shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce,
where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States ... and where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.°
(noting that elements of the Sherman and Clayton Acts' vertical restraints provisions are "virtually
identical"). The Clayton Act's vertical restraints provisions lack the facility to address the emer-
gence of dominant retailer and its exercise of market power over the manufacturer and supplier
and thus are not a focus of this Article. See generally 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 304 (1995)
[hereinafter ANTITRUST 1] (Sherman and Clayton Act standards coalesce). Although the elements
of proof are virtually identical, the Sherman Act language, though it has not been utilised to
address the emerging exercise of market power by large retailers, is certainly broad enough to
provide the foundation for antitrust enforcement authorities to address retailer-imposed vertical
restraints.
"See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). The Robinson-Pathan Act was passed in 1936. For a more
detailed discussion of the history of the Robinson-Paunan Act, see VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS, supra note 3, § 9,04.
67 15 U.S.C. § 13.
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The Robinson-Patman Act's primary thrust is to prevent manufac-
turers and suppliers from providing discriminatory prices to, and
from acceding to demands of, dominant retailers. Although the
Robinson-Patman Act would also appear to be intended to address
the more recent developments in the retail marketplace identified
by the EC—namely, the emergence of dominant retailers as "gate-
keepers" to the marketplace, as well as competitors to manufactur-
ers—it does not effectively do so. The Robinson-Patman Act prohib-
its price discrimination, 68 not price differentiation, and numerous
defenses are available under the statute to justify differentiating
between the prices offered to, and treatment of, various retailers.
Moreover, its focus is on protecting smaller retailers as opposed to
protecting the supply market and thus, as currently constituted, it
is an unsuitable vehicle to address the issues raised by the Kesko/
Tuko decision.69 Further, the so-called Fred Meyer Guidelines, which
interpret the Robinson-Patman Act, although advisory and amend-
ed as recently as 1990, do not address any of the implications of the
dual role of the dominint, private-label retailer as a "customer" as
well as a "seller." 70
In enacting the Robinson-Paunan Act, Congress was responding
to a change in the dynamic of the 1936 marketplace, driven by the
emergence of large retailers. Specifically, Congress noted: "A vivid idea
of the enormous bargaining power embodied in chain store purchases
may be gained from the fact that the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company makes purchases of merchandise amounting to over
$800,000,000 annually and other large chains make purchases in pro-
portionate amounts."
69 VON KALINOWSKI, ANTurRosT LAWS, Mira note 3, § 9.04[4].
°Conventional wisdom has often been that enhanced "buying power," so long as it with-
stands scrutiny under the Robinson-Patman Act, ought not enter the realm of consideration in
appraising retailer mergers. See, e.g., 5 PIIILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUS'F PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 1104 (1980 & Stipp, 1996)
[hereinafter ANTITRUST II] (noting that such cases arc likely to be far too rare to warrant the
assessment of the exercise of market power by buyers).
79 See 16 G.F.R. § 240 et seq. (1998), The Fred Meyer Guidelines were established by the FTC
to provide guidance for compliance with the Robinson-Pannan Act. See id. § 240,1 They provide
definitions of terms generally used in the Robinson-Pattnan Act as guidance with respect to the
application of the Act to certain sales transactions situations. See id. § 240.3 et seq.
7i 11,R. REP. No. 2287, pt. 1, at 3 (1936) (1936 Prohibition on Price Discriminations). The
Robinson-Patman Act was designed to address this perceived inequality by prohibiting discrimi-
nation in price between purchasers where such discrimination could not be shown to he justified.
Id. at 7.
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While perhaps the supporters of the Robinson-Patrnan Act did not
recognize that they were dealing with a dynamic that would grow and
change dramatically over the years, the ability of retailers as private
label operators to exert market power was not lost on opponents of
the legislation. For example, the minority report countered:
What is to prevent, for example, a large company like the
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. from letting down the bars and
selling [their] private brands of coffee and tea and other
goods, heretofore limited to their own stores, to all inde-
pendent grocers? What is to prevent them from going into
actual wholesaling?72
The minority report, while not focusing on the retailer's ability to
exercise market power through private label marketing in its own
stores, did recognize the potential power embodied in private label
marketing and supply. The minority report, furthermore, recognized
the potential for large retailers to function as "gatekeepers" in the
market. In that regard, the minority report noted: "What is to prevent
a large distributor from increasing his own manufacturing facilities
vertically until he directly distributes from the factory door to the
consumer door?""
While these potential transformations of the marketplace were
thus recognized by the Robinson-Patman Act, in the sixty-plus years
since its enactment, this marketplace dynamic has never been directly
addressed in the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act or, for that
matter, in the enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
C. The Federal Trade Commission Act
A fourth significant antitrust statute, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act ("FTC Act"), 74
 prohibits "unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce."75 The prohibition of unfair methods of compe-
tition extends beyond those practices that would violate the other
72 Id., pt.2, at 17.
73 Id., pt.2, at 18,
74 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994). The Federal Trade Commission Act was passed in 1914. As
a result of concerns with the efficacy of the Sherman Act to achieve Congress's goals, it created
a commission with true regulatory powers and vested it with the authority to define and prohibit
a broad spectrum of unfair methods of competition and deceptive business practices. See VON
KALIN'OWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 3, § 9.03111.
75 15 U.S.C. § 45.
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antitrust laws, and thus has been used to fill gaps left by those laws. It
also has been applied to preclude standard antitrust offenses such as
horizontal and vertical price-fixing, anti-competitive group boycotts,
exclusive dealings, monopolization, attempted monopolization and
conspiracies to monopolize.
The FTC Act is, along with the Sherman Act, an appropriate
vehicle for addressing the undue exercise of market power in the
procurement market by powerful retailers. In re Toys-R-Us, for example,
reflects reliance on the FTC Act to address the exercise of market
power as a powerful retailer. The utilization of the FTC Act to address
the exercise of such potential market power by a powerful retailer
portends that the FTC Act (and the Sherman Act) will provide the
foundation for a re-evaluation of the approach by U.S. antitrust en-
forcement authorities to the exercise of retailer market dominance.'"
The extent to which the changing retail market dynamic can be ad-
dressed by these statutes—and the degree to which legislative and
regulatory evaluation is suggested—are discussed in the following sec-
tions of this Article."
D. U.S. Antitrust Law Enforcement Guidelines
While considerable case law has developed concerning the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts' provisions in the merger context, written guide-
lines issued by the enforcement authorities have been the primary
source of interpreting the current state of U.S. antitrust laws. Those
guidelines, although revised in recent years, continue to focus on the
traditional elements of market power concerns—protecting competi-
tion by reference to the impact of the exercise of market power on the
consumer and the direct competitor. As such, they do not presently
address the market power of the dominant retailer as either a "gate-
keeper" or a dual customer and competitor.'"
76 See In re Toys-R-Us, F.T.C. No. 9278, Final Order, Opinion of Commission, at 5 (Oct, 13,
1998) available at <http://wwwfic.gov/as/1998/9810/toyrsinord.lniti > (last visited Mar. 4,
1999).
" See supra notes 78-155 and accompanying text.
"The failure of the Guidelines to address the effect of the dominant retailer in the market-
place is largely a function of the fact that the Guidelines appear to be drafted on the primary
premise that the mergers addressed will involve manufacturers of goods, rather than retailers or
service providers.
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1. The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines
In 1992, the United States Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") jointly issued guidelines concerning the
analysis of horizontal mergers ("1992 Guidelines" ).'y These guidelines
are of general applicability and do not focus on any particular industry
or market sector. The 1992 Guidelines are predicated upon a defer-
ence to free market controls and an emphasis on the protection of the
consumer and actual or potential competitors. The 1992 Guidelines'
definition of markets and the exercise of market power is rooted in
that framework. Accordingly, the 1992 Guidelines are not oriented
toward addressing the more complex market dynamics raised by the
EC's analysis of the powerful retailer's exercise of market power in the
procurement marketplacc. 8°
In evaluating the potential for the exercise of market power, the
1992 Guidelines specifically state that the focus, with respect to the
potential profit of the merging firms, should be on evaluating how
likely it is that a potential monopoly would impose at least a "small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price." 81 In describing the
price to be examined in retail markets, the 1992 Guidelines specifically
state that "in a merger between retailers, the relevant price would be
the retail price of a product to consumers."". The 1992 Guidelines
The 1992 Guidelines were amended in 1997 to address the manner in which efficiencies
obtained through a horizontal merger would be assessed. See 1992 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 4
(amended 1997).
S9 See id. § 0.1. The 1992 Guidelines do address broader concerns about misallocation of
resources and suppression of production which, by extension, bear on the broader issue of the
need to address the emergence of powerful retailers in the grocery and mass merchandise
markets and their ability to exercise market power at differing levels. The 1984 Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines ("1984 Guidelines") did, to some degree, address non-horizontal
mergers and the potential role of parties as participants in various vertically integrated markets.
See 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4, 49 Fed. Reg. 26823, 26834 (1984). The 1984 Guidelines deemed
such so-called "vertical" or "conglomerate" mergers while "not invariably innocuous," to be far
less likely to create competitive problems. Id. In assessing vertical integration to the retail level,
the guidelines considered adverse competitive consequences to be "unlikely unless the upstream
market [supply market] is generally conducive to collusion and a large percentage of the products
produced there are sold through vertically integrated retail outlets." Id. § 4.221, 49 Fed. Reg. at
26836.
The reluctance to perceive the potential antitrust implications identified in the Kesko/7'uko
decision, reflected in the language of the 1984 Guidelines, underscores the need, more fully
discussed in the text, for a re-evaluation by U.S., antitrust enforcement authorities of their
approach to these issues.
81 1992 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1.1.
82 1d. § 1.1, 11.11.
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define market power as the ability of a seller to profitably "maintain
prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time," noting
that market power may also lessen competition on dimensions such as
product quality, service or innovation." The result of such an exercise
of market power, the 1992 Guidelines note, "is a transfer of wealth from
buyers to sellers or a misallocation of resources."84
Although the 1992 Guidelines focus primarily on the ability of
sellers to exercise market power and direct that this be the primary
focus in retailer mergers, they also recognize the potential for buyers to
exercise market power. The 1992 Guidelines envision buyers exercising
market power as single monopolists or a coordinated group, thereby
depressing the price paid for a product to a level that is below the
competitive price and depressing production." Neither the broader
implications of the exercise of market power by powerful retailers in
the procurement market, nor its implications in other markets, is
addressed. The exercise of market power over suppliers by merging
buyers has been identified by U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities as
within the realm of possibility. Recognition of such buyer dominance
by federal antitrust enforcement authorities, however, has been ex-
ceedingly rare." Unlike their EC counterparts, U.S. antitrust. enforce-
ment authorities, while recognizing potential problems in principle,
have elected to treat the buyer market power of retailers as a yet
unimportant issue. As market consolidation and concentration contin-
ues, the need to recognize and analyze emerging buyer power and the
"gatekeeper" role will require a re-assessment of this approach.
" Id. § 0.1.
84 id.
85 See id.
86 see AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAWS II, supra note 69, § 965 (citing United States v.
Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Stipp, 962 (WI). Pa. 1965) (citing Pennzoil "as the wily case of which we arc
aware in which a violation of section 7 [of the Clayton Act] was predicated solely on buyer
concentration"). Notably, the Pennzoil case involved the proposed merger of producers and
refiners, as opposed to retail operations. See id.; see also VON KALINOWSXI, ANTITRUST LAWS, supra
note 3, § 25.06 (noting the relatively few cases considering the exercise of so-called "monopsony"
power by buyers). Monopsony power has been viewed as arising in very limited circumstances,
See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663 0.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing RICHARD G.
LIPSEY Er AL., ECONOMICS 976 (7th ed. 1984)) (defining monopsony as a market situation where
a single buyer or a group of buyers make joint decisions); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907
F.2d 510, 514 11.1 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (defining monopsony as a situation where
there is only one buyer). In United States v. Syufy Enterprise, the Justice Department alleged that
the defendant, a movie theater operator, exercised itionopsony power against its suppliers. 903
F.2d at 661-62. In In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, cattlemen brought private claims against
meat packers. 907 F.2d at 511-12. In both instances, the claims were found factually insufficient.
The recognition of potential monopsony power by a party like Syufy, with a dominant retail
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Driven by market realities, the 1992 Guidelines do acknowledge
that mergers can effect benefits to the economy by enhancing the
efficiency of the merged entities. The 1992 Guidelines thus recognize
that some mergers that might otherwise be challenged may be justified
by the achievement of certain net efficiencies.B7 The notable efficien-
cies that are identified include economies of scale, lower overall costs
and reductions in general selling and other expenses. Although ap-
pearing to address the ability to reduce the cost of supplies and other
expenses as benefits, the 1992 Guidelines separately recognize that the
monopolist is assumed to pursue maximum profits, and not to pass
savings along to the consumer." The 1992 Guidelines do not, however,
take the step of integrating those concerns so as to recognize that
through its "gatekeeper" function, the dominant retailer can exercise
market power to control the supplier price and simultaneously maxi-
mize profits to the detriment of the consumer.
2. National Association of Attorneys General Horizontal Guidelines
The 1993 Horizontal Merger Guidelines adopted by the National
Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG Guidelines") follow a similar
approach to the 1992 Federal Guidelines.89 The NAAG Guidelines
identify the transfer of wealth from consumers to firms that can exer-
cise market power by profitably maintaining prices above competitive
levels for a significant period of time as "the major evil" designed to
be addressed by the Clayton Act. 9° This wealth transfer orientation, the
NAAG Guidelines note, is similarly embodied in the Sherman Act
provisions.9 '
position over its suppliers, reflected a promising start. The skepticism with which monopsony
claims have been viewed, however, leaves little promise that a focus on monopsony power, in
addressing the growing market power of emerging power retailers, is likely.
87 See 1992 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 4 (amended 1997).
88 See id. § 1.11.
89 The NAAG Guidelines reflect the general enforcement policy of the state and territorial
attorneys general with respect to horizontal acquisitions and mergers under the Clayton and
Sherman Acts, as well as analogous provisions of certain states' antitrust laws. The state attorneys
general arc the primary, exclusive public enforcer of antitrust laws in most states. See ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION: PRIMARY SOURCE PAMPHLET 281, § 1 (2d ed. 1997). While it is
unlikely, in the case of a dominant retailer, that the state attorney general would be the sole or
primary enforcement authority, the NAAG Guidelines are instructive for the insight they provide
on U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities' perspective on horizontal merger issues, particularly
as they relate to the issue of dominant retailers and the exercise of market power by dominant
retailers with respect to their procurement activities.
90 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 89, § 2.11.
9i See id.
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A primary focus of the NAAG Guidelines remains the implications
for the consumer in light of the potential for a merger to raise the cost
of merging parties' competitors. In particular, the NAAG Guidelines
recognize that a merger could increase the power of a firm to affect
the prices that its competitors must pay for products and supplies.
Accordingly, the Guidelines note that "if the market structure is such
that these increased costs can be passed on to consumers, then the
prevention of this effect is consistent with the goals of anti-trust laws." 92
With regard to efficiencies obtained through the merger of competi-
tors, the NAAG Guidelines recognize that "[g] oals such as productive
and allocative efficiency are generally consistent with, though subsidi-
ary to, the central goal of preventing wealth transfers from consumers
to firms possessing market power?" The NAAG Guidelines acknow-
ledge, however, that although productive efficiency may cause firms in
highly competitive industries to "pass on some of the savings to con-
sumers in the form of lower prices," to the extent that a merger
increases market power for the resulting entity, there is less likelihood
that productive efficiencies will be passed along to the consumer. 94
The NAAG Guidelines also consider the implications of the exist-
ence of powerful or sophisticated buyers in the marketplace.95 Its per-
spective, however, differs from that of the EC. The NAAG Guidelines
focus on the fact that collusion can be frustrated by the presence of
powerful and sophisticated buyers who are "appropriately situated to
force firms in the primary market to negotiate secretly or offer sub-
stantial concessions for the large purchasers."96 Although in most cir-
cumstances, the NAAG Guidelines conclude, the presence of such
buyers is unlikely to prevent anticompetitive effects from occurring,
the NAAG Guidelines focus exclusively on these buyers' ability to
restrain the exercise of market power by others (i.e., competitors), as
opposed to their ability to exercise market power by forcing manufac-
turing and supply firms in the primary market to negotiate secretly or
offer concessions to the powerful and sophisticated buyer.
The Guidelines do recognize that "if some, but not all of the
buyers in the market are powerful and sophisticated, the former may
be able to achieve price concessions while the less powerful buyers
92 Id. § 2,14.
93 Id. § 2.
94 Id.
95 The term "powerful or sophisticated buyers" is one utilized in the NAAG Guidelines. NAAG
Guidelines, supra note 89, § 5.4. The Guidelines do nut provide a definition for that term.
99 Id, §
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would not."97 In those instances, the NAAG Guidelines provide that the
merger should be evaluated in terms of its impact on the less powerful
buyers." This analysis reflects traditional concerns for the impact of
the exercise of market power on competitors. Consideration of the
ability of powerful and sophisticated buyers to achieve price conces-
sions at the expense of the suppliers—most of whom cannot afford not
to maintain commercial relations with these retailers—is however, not
addressed. Moreover, the implication of the broader role of such buy-
ers is not considered.
E. Application of US. Antitrust Law and Guidelines in Retailer Mergers
The guidelines arc just that, guidelines. They are not static docu-
ments from which the enforcement authorities cannot depart as cir-
cumstances warrant. It is certainly clear from both the 1992 Guidelines
and the NAAG, however, that the predominant concern of the enforce-
ment authorities is whether merging retailers have the ability to (a) in-
crease the cost to the consumer and (b) dominate their competitors.
The enforcement authorities, however, have shown varying degrees of
recognition and response to the developments in the retail market-
place that were identified by the EC in the Kesko/Tuko decision.
The approach of U.S. enforcement authorities to Kesko/Tuko
issues is revealed in their discussions of policies for analyzing retail
mergers and, inter alia, their handling of two recently proposed merg-
ers in the retail marketplace. A review of their respective analyses will
permit an assessment of the potential for U.S. antitrust enforcement
authorities to address the role of the dominant retailer in the procure-
ment marketplace and its antitrust implications.
1. Policy Perspective
The FTC is well aware of the emergence of mass merchandisers in
the food market and the increased retail marketing of private labels."
The FTC has acknowledged that wholesale clubs and certain mass
97 7d, 5.4, n.49.
98 See id. § 5.4.
99 See Federal Trade Commissioner Christine A. Varney, Ensuring Competition in the Food
Marketing industry, Prepared Remarks before the Food Marketing Institute (June 6, 1995),
available in 1995 WI. 395992, at *1. While the published version of these remarks reflects that
they are those of Commissioner Varney and not of the Frc or other individual commissioners,
they are reflective of a typical view of the marketplace and an identification of certain changing
dynamics in food and mass merchandise marketing.
The Frc is an independent commission headed by five commissioners, nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, each serving a seven-year term. The President chooses
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merchandisers are entering the arena of full service supermarkets and,
to some degree, giving the supermarkets "a run for their money. "10°
The 1992 Guidelines form the basis of the FTC's analysis of the super-
market mergers.'m In defining the market, the focus is usually on
particularly large supermarkets.'" One view espoused by the FTC is
that, while all circumstances must be analyzed, it would be a unique
circumstance where a mass merchandiser's or warehouse club's market
penetration into food retailing would be so deep and established that
their offerings might compete against traditional supermarkets."
The FTC assesses grocery retail market concentration and the
ability to exercise market power by use of a simple calculation of
market share percentage for supermarkets of like size in accordance
with the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Indexl" ("HHI") discussed in the
Guidelines, which transfers market concentration levels into numeric
form. 105 Barriers to entry and likelihood of anticompetitive effects are
analyzed on the basis of how easy it is for a new entrant to set up a
one Commissioner to act as Chairman and no more than three Commissioners can be of the
same political party.
The FTC enforces a variety of federal antitrust and consumer protection laws. The Commis-
sion seeks to ensure that the nation's markets function competitively and arc vigorous, efficient
and free of undue restrictions. Within that realm of responsibility, the Commission has, inter alia,
oversight responsibility with respect to proposed mergers and the ability to pursue injunctive
relief to restrict or foreclose mergers which it believes will have anticompetitive results. For more
information on the FTC, see generally Federal Trade Commission, Working for Consumer Protec-
tion and a Competitive Marketplace (visited Mar. 4, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov >.
1 m See Varney, supra note 99, at *I /1,2 (citing PHILIP FI•ZELL, supra note 10; David Mills,
Private Labels and Countervailing Power in Retail Distribution (1992) (unpublished theoretical
work, University of Virginia) (on file with authors)); see also More Shopper Bypass Big Name Brands
and Steer Carts to Private Label Products, supra note 10, at 131. In the area of private labels, a view
expressed is that, while private label products are being increasingly pushed by traditional
supermarkets, this development is positive since it has generally led to lower prices for consumers.
This view does not address, inter alia, the impact of private labels on the exercise of market power
by powerful retailers against both suppliers and consumers and the potential concomitant impact
on overall price decreases from suppliers and increases to consumers.
101 Varney, supra note 99, at *2. (while noting that the speech is an expression of Commis-
sioner Varney's opinion, the text purports to discuss how the FTC staff reviews supermarket
mergers).
In See id. (rioting that the FTC has found that full-line self-service supermarkets with annual
sales volume of $2 million or more represent a relevant product market).
"See id. While the cited speech does riot address the point, it is noteworthy that Wal-Mart,
the largest mass merchandiser, which is rapidly becoming the nation's largest grocer, also owns
Sam's Club, a leading warehouse club.
1 " The I lerfindahl-Ilirshmann Index ("111.11") is the sum or the squares of the market shares
of all firms operating within the relevant market_ For example, a market with four 20% firms and
two 10% firms has an HIE of 1800. For a history of the discussion of the early use of the index,
see Albert 0. flirshinann, The Pattern of an Index, 54 Ass. EcoN. REV. 761 (1964).
1 °5 See Varney, supra note 99, at *3.
560	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:537
supermarket in a given area in two years or less, with a primary focus
on how developers and realtors view the ability to establish a new
store. "6
Although the traditional approach to the supermarket market-
place has been advocated by members of the FTC, 1 U7 the view of the
enforcement authorities on these issues is not static. The emergence of
mass merchandisers in the food retailing marketplace, the develop-
ment of the "gatekeeper" function for large mass merchandisers and
other dominant food retailers and the facility to exercise power
through private label marketing, although not new developments, are
clearly within the purview of the FTC. Its views on these matters are
(and, as the EC exemplified, should be) subject to change based on
the dynamics of the market.'° 8
2. Recent Retailer Merger Analyses
Two recent examinations of proposed retailer mergers illustrate
the traditional analysis, pursuant to the federal guidelines, of the
potential creation of powerful retailers, focusing primarily on the con-
sumer perspective.mElements of the analyses of these proposed merg-
ers, however, also reveal a growing recognition of the need to account
for emerging dynamics in the subject retail markets.
a. RiteAid/Revco
In April of 1996, the FTC announced that, as a result of an
investigation conducted in conjunction with six state attorneys gen-
eral,"° it intended to seek an injunction barring the merger between
106 See id. at *4.
1 °7 See id. That the enforcement authorities have not recognized the implications that the EC
recognized in terms of the market dynamics or the retail marketplace in the United States should
not be viewed as foreclosing the recognition of those issues in future analyses of retail market
mergers and practices.
l" The Ff C is mindful of the need to adapt its enforcement process and policies to changing
market dynamics. See FEDERAL Titsm: COMMISSION, Anticipating the 21st Century, Apr. 1997,
available in 1997 WL 174936, at *1 (noting that "[blecause so many sectors of the economy are
changing—and changing rapidly—the FFC enforcement process must be a dynamic one," and
that, accordingly, the FTC "must constantly reexamine its law enforcement policies .. ."),
1 E19
 While the proposed Rite-Aid/Revco and Staples/Office Depot mergers are chosen as
subjects for an evaluation of the manner in which enforcement authorities view merger transac-
tions among large retailers, it is beyond the scope of this Article's thesis to comment on the merits
of each of those proposed acquisitions or the enforcement agencies' actions.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act proscribes "unfair methods of competi-
tion." 15 U.S.C. § 45. The F1'C is authorized by section 5(a) of the FTC Act to investigate and
challenge alleged anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions. See id. § 45(a) (2). Upon finding a
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RiteAid Corporation and Revco D.S. Inc., a merger that would have
created a combined firm with nearly 5000 drugstores."' In determin-
ing that the proposed RiteAid/Revco merger would have negative
antitrust implications, the FTC examined the effect of the transaction
on price to the consumer.'" The FTC, however, departed from the
traditional. analysis of the consumer as the cash-paying customer.w'
Instead, the FTC recognized that the market for prescriptions had
evolved to the point that the primary affected party was not the cash-
paying customer, but rather was the managed care provider who pro-
vided pharmacy benefits to its patients and was dependent, to a sig-
nificant degree, upon access to low-cost chains to serve its network of
patients. Accordingly, the FTC concluded that these providers would
be subject to price increases if two low-cost chains were to merge.
Facing FTC opposition, RitcAid and Revco ultimately withdrew their
merger plans.
Although the FTC's analysis does not reflect a departure from the
traditional antitrust merger standards, it does consider a significant
change in the manner in which enforcement authorities have tradi-
tionally viewed retail markets. The RiteAid/Revco scenario shows that
enforcement authoritics 114 are prepared to shift their substantive focus
from the guideline parameters to the competitive facts in a particular
marketplace, and then to apply the guideline parameters to the facts
of the particular transaction. This type of developing analysis may
foster U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities' recognition of the impli-
cations of the changing retail market dynamics that the EC recognized
in Kesko/Tuko.
violation of section 5, the FCC may File au administrative complaint to be tried before an
administrative law judge ("ALJ"), See id. § 45(b). If a violation of law is found by the ALI a cease
and desist order will issue which may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals and,
ultimately, the United States Supreme Court. See id § 45(c); see also VON KALINOWSKI, Arcri-ruos.r
LAWS, supra note 3, § 29.0313].
"I See FTC Will Seek to Block RiteAid/Revco Merger: Deal Could Lead to Higher Prescription
Prices in Numerous Metro Areas Along East Coast and in the Midwest, Agency Alleges, ETC. File No.
9510020, Apr. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL, 181411, at *1.
112 Id.
115 See id; George Cary, Deputy Director for Mergers, Bureau of Competition of the Federal
Trade Commission, Staying Ahead of the Merger Wave, Prepared Remarks before the 15th
Annual Corporate Counsel Institute (Dec. 12, 1996) available in 1996 WL 715630, at *3.
IHTlie enforcement authorities in the RiteAid/Revco matter were the FTC and 6 states'
attorneys general. See Cary, supra note 113.
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b. Staples/Office Depot
In the proposed Staples/Office Depot merger, the enforcement
authorities followed the traditional tack of focusing purely on the
impact of price to the consumer. The proposed merger of Staples and
Office Depot endeavored to create approximately 1000 retail office
supply stores. Arguing that the proposed merger would increase the
retail price to the consumer, the FTC sought to enjoin the transac-
tion."' In contesting the Staples/Office Depot merger, the FTC stated
that "kin evaluating the legality of a merger, the antitrust laws essen-
tially require a prediction as to whether the deal is likely to lead to less
competition, and consequently, to higher prices for 'consumers."
The FTC, in concluding that a challenge to the transaction was
warranted, predicted that the merger would cause significant con-
sumer harm by increasing the costs that small businesses and consum-
ers would pay for office supplies." 7 In evaluating the dynamic between
the Staples and Office Depot operations and other sellers of office
supplies, the FTC found that the nature of the Staples and Office
Depot superstores and the combination of price, convenience and
product offerings were such that office superstores ought to be evalu-
ated as a separate product market, rather than as part of a general
office supply retailer product market."' In passing, the FTC observed
that both Staples and Office Depot have been "able to leverage their
huge volumes into price concessions from their suppliers."" 9 The
FTC's pleadings also note without any significant discussion that Sta-
ples and Office Depot drove thousands of independent stationers out
of business and eliminated rivals who sought to compete in the office
superstore market.' 2°
"5 See Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to
Section 13(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc.,
970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. 1997) (No. 97-CV00701) available at Federal Trade Commission (last
visited Mar. 15, 1999) Chttp://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/9704/pubbrief.htm >; Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum, Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. 1997) (No. 97-CV00701)
available at Federal Trade Commission (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/
9704/pubbrief.hun>.
116 See Plaintiffs Memorandum, Preliminary Statement, Federal Trade Commission v. Staples,
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, (No. 97-CV700701).
"7
' 18 /d., Argument, pt.lI1. The use of the term "product market" with reference to a retail
operation is indicative of the focus of U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities on product or goods
manufacturers over the last 50 years. The term, however, as reflected, inter alit:, in the Sta-
ples/Office Depot and Revco/Rite Aid matters is applicable to the description, from an antitrust
perspective, of retail and service markets.
119
 Id., Argument, pt.5.
In Id., Preliminary Statement; see also FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky, Staples and Boe-
ing: What They Say About Merger Enforcement at the FTC, Speech to Business Development
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On June 30, 1997, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia issucd an order enjoining the Staples/Office Depot mer-
ger and, consequently, that merger was not consummated. 121 Al though
identifying the office superstore as a submarket of the overall office
supply market, the court primarily focused on the traditional analysis
of the impact on the price charged consumers. 122 In its conclusion, the
court noted that superstores effected price decreases because "the
superstores have increased their buying power, forcing manufacturers
and suppliers to implement efficiencies in their own businesses in
order to compete in the sale of their products."I 29 The propriety of the
application and use of this market power, however, was not addressed
by the court.
In its analysis of the Staples/Office Depot merger, the FTC and
the court employed the traditional guidelines' focus on the consumer.
The respective analyses of superstores as a separate market, however,
may foreshadow a willingness of the enforcement authorities to grap-
ple with changes in market. dynamics. Moreover, implicit in the analysis
was the recognition that large retailers can and do exert market power .
over their suppliers. The issue remains, however, whether U.S. antitrust
enforcement authorities will eventually pursue the analysis to its logical
conclusion.
3. Recent FTC Enforcement Analysis
a. Toy s-R-Us
Recent FTC enforcement actions provide some answer as to
whether the FTC will recognize that large retailers exert market power
over suppliers and other entities. In administrative litigation against
Toys-R-Us ("TRU"), the FTC seemed willing to acknowledge changes
in these market dynamics. 124 In the complaint. against TRU, the FTC
Associates, Washington, D.C., (Sept. 23, 1997), available in Federal Trade Commission speeches
(last visited Mar. 15, 1999) Chttp://wwwfte.gov/specches/pitofsky/STAPLESspc.htni > (stating
that the Staples action and product market definition that "kin effect the Commission argued
that office supply superstores are to small office supply outlets as super market food chains arc
to independent groceries . ."). In so noting, the FI'C Chairman cited to United States u Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), which rejected a supermarket merger and ordered divestiture,
noting that a merger of this sort violates the Clayton Act when it takes place in a market
characterized by a long and continuous trend toward fewer and fewer owner-competitors. See
Pitofsky, supra.
121 See Order and Redacted Memorandum Opinion, Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc.,
970 F. Stipp. 1066 (No. 97-701), at 1069.
122 See, e.g., id. at 1075-78. .
123 1d. at 1093.
124 See In re Toys-R-Us, Inc., Complaint, F.T.C. No. 9278, (May 22, 1996), available in <http://
www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9810/toyrsinorditurt > (last visited Mar. 4, 1999).
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alleged that the nation's largest toy retailer used its market power to
keep toy prices high by extracting exclusionary agreements from major
toy manufacturers concerning sales to warehouse clubs. 125 The action,
brought pursuant to the FTC Act, alleged that TRU's "importance as
a provider of distribution to manufacturers of toys and related prod-
ucts has given it the ability to exercise market power over those manu-
facturers . . . . "126 In discussing the TRU matter, the FTC stated that the
acquiescence of manufacturers to the demands of a major retailer
constitute "buyer power."'"
On September 25, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")
issued an initial decision in the FTC's favor, affirming the FTC's ex-
pressed position regarding the exercise of "buyer power." 28 Among
other conclusions reached, the judge stated that "TRU exerts its domi-
nance as a buyer of toys. TRU also exercises market power as a seller
of toys. TRU's power as a buyer and seller are related." 129
On this basis, the Atj concluded that TRU had created both a
vertical agreement by enforcing an anticompetitive policy which re-
strained manufacturers from supplying warehouse clubs, and also cre-
ated a horizontal conspiracy among manufacturers.'s° TRU was able to
orchestrate this activity, the judge concluded, because it "exercises
market power as a buyer and seller of toys." 131 In determining whether
such market power exists, the ALJ held that
[m]arket power exists if Toys-R-Us can exert leverage over the
manufacturers. Leverage exists when the manufacturer can-
not find a ready substitute. A retailer has sufficient bargaining
power to cause anti-competitive effects, when the retailer
(1) has "hard-to-replace distribution skills or facilities;" (2) "is
a multibrand retailer that could threaten to drop one brand
in favor of another;" or (3) "accounts for such a large volume
of business that his replacement would involve substantial dis-
ruption that would not be outweighed by retaining a smaller
complained-against dealer."' 32
125 /d. 11 7-9, 12.
4 .
127
 See William J. Baer, Report from the Bureau of Competition, Prepared Remarks before
the American Bar Association Antitrust Section (Spring 1997) available in 1997 WL 192443, at
*14.
128 See Toys-k-Us, Initial Decision, F.T.C. No. 9278, available in <http://www.ftc.gov/os/  1998/
9810/toyrsinord.htm> (last visited Mac 4, 1999).
12° id, Findings, 1 421.
111 Id. at 101-02.
151 Id. at 112-13.
132 Id. at 113 (citing to Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476
ti.23 (1992); In to California Dental Ass'n., F.T.C. No. 9259, at 30 VII (March 25, 1996).
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The Ali also found that TRU, as "the leading retailer of toys in
the United States, has power as a purchaser of toys from manufactur-
ers" and that these manufacturers "would have difficulty finding alter-
native buyers to replace TRU."'" In this capacity, TRU has "leverage
over the manufacturers," and can "cause serious financial harm to
nianufacturers." 134
On October 13, 1998, the FTC issued a final order affirming the
ALJ's decision. In that order and in the opinion supporting the order,
the FTC recognized the significance of its decision with respect. to
other large retailers, stating that "[i]f a large toy retailer can engage
in the actions pursued by TRU, then any large retailer in any sector of
retailing could do the same, foreclosing competition in what has been
over the years the highly competitive, open and efficient retailing
sector of the United States economy."'"
In reviewing the ALJ's finding, the FTC reiterated its concerns
with TRU's market power, noting that TRU buys about thirty percent
or more of the large traditional toy company's total output.'" and that
the large percentage share understates TRU's actual market power.'"
The FTC concluded that, although TRU was "not a monopolist or a
monopsonist,"'" it "enjoys a dominant position in buying and selling
toys."'" As a result, the FTC found that suppliers were dependent on
TRU and that, while TRU could choose between different manufactur-
ers and suppliers, the manufacturers could not find another retailer
to make up for TRU's market share should TRU decide to terminate
its relationship with them. The power that was recognized in the TRU
opinion is, in many ways, a development towards a recognition of many
of the factors that the EC recognized in Kesko/Tuko.
The FTC's and the ALJ's recognition of the existence of "buyer
power" in the TRU context shows the potential for a more compre-
I" in re Toys-R-Us Inc., F.T.C. No. 9278, Initial Decision, Findings, 111 422-23.
11^ Findings, 428, 437 (noting, inter alia, that a small video company put itself up for
sale after TRU dropped its line). The decision also notes that TRU was able to impose a Most
Favored Nation Clause" that afforded TRU a lower price if, after a TRU purchase, a TRU
competitor obtained a lower price for a product, and was also able to obtain a disproportionate
share of "hot product." Id., Findings, XX 511, 519.
135 In re Tays-R-Us, Inc., Filial Order, Opinion of the Commission, F.T.C. No. 9278, at 1 (Oct.
13, 1998).
136 Id. at 4.
137 Id. at 37.
138 It has been said that the mirror image of "monopoly" is "monopsony." A monoponist is
a monopoly buyer rather than seller, See liovENKAmp, supra note 1, § 1.2; see also supra note 86
and accompanying text,
119 Toys-R-1.15, Final Order, Opinion of the Commission, F.T.C. No. 9278, at 97 (Oct. 13, 1998).
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hensive assessment by the FTC of the emerging retail market dynamics
discussed in Kesko/Tuko. It also portends greater utilization of the FTC
Act as a vehicle to evaluate and address market power concentration
and utilization by powerful retailers.
III. THE CHANGING MARKETPLACE DYNAMICS RECOGNIZED BY THE
EC ARE REALITIES IN THE U.S. MARKET
The evolving market dynamics identified by the EC in Kesko/Tuko
are present in our domestic U.S. marketplace. The application of the
Kesko/Tuko principles to the evaluation of mergers and practices by
U.S. antitrust authorities can be predicated in the food and mass
merchandise marketplace in the United States. In this manner, the
Finnish marketplace is not an anomaly.
The Kesko/Tuko decision is the first decision to recognize the
antitrust implications of the emergence of powerful retailers and their
control of the marketplace through (1) their "gatekeeper" function
and (2) their dual status as private label competitor and customer.
Retail trade publications, however, have focused on the emergence of
powerful retailers and their ability to exercise significant power in the
U.S. marketplace. Those publications have recognized that the consoli-
dation of supermarket chains and the emergence of dominant retail-
ers—such as Wal-Mart and others—have transformed the retail mar-
ketplace and consolidated the "gatekeeper" role in the modern U.S.
retailing market in the hands of an increasingly smaller number of
parties.'
The emergence of powerful retailers and their growing ability to
serve as "gatekeepers" to the marketplace is aided by the active con-
solidation of grocery retailers."' Compounding this effect in the food
retail market is the entry of large mass merchandisers into grocery
marketing. Using the superstore concept, these mass merchandisers
140 See infra notes 141-46. As discussed in note 11, supra, the grocery and mass merchandise
markets arc discussed in this Article as examples of retail consolidation and the growth of
powerful retailers. While retail power in other markets is apparent, as exemplified by the Toys.
R-Us, Staples and Rite Aid/Revco scenarios, these markets are chosen as topics for this Article's
analysis, given the rapid consolidation and apparent growth they arc experiencing.
141 While the top five U.S. grocery retailers only account for about 20% of the overall market,
on a regional basis, there has been significant growth in concentration in the grocery retail
market. See Steven J. Hoch, flaw Should National Brands Think About Private Labels?, 37 SLOAN
MANAGEMENT Raw. 89 (1996); Food Industry Merger Activity Rises, SuPramARKET Bus., Feb. 1995,
at 13 (reporting that about 40 mergers and acquisitions in the supermarket industry occurred in
the prior year); William I1. Borghesani, Jr. et al., Food For Thought: The Emergence of Power
Buyers and Its Challenge to Competition Analysis 1, 6-9 (Keller & Heckman LLP, Washington
D.C. 1997).
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have the ability to achieve, and are achieving, significantly greater
concentration in grocery retailing. 142 The entry of so-called "supercen-
ters" has the potential to create market "superpowers" that will radically
alter the food industry.'" The emergence of powerful retailers in the
grocery retail business has conventional supermarket operators,'"
many of whom have high levels of regional market concentration,
"petrified" of their perceived buying disadvantage.'" The exercise of
such buying power, either by the mass merchandisers or the consoli-
dated regional supermarket operations, is already a reality in the cur-
rent U.S. market.' 46 This power, whether or not used punitively, has the
potential to give a few merchandisers significant power over suppliers,
smaller competitors and the consumer market.
Although the U.S. market's concentration does not, by any meas-
ure, match the concentration that would have been achieved in Fin-
land by the Kesko/Tuko merger, market indicators reflect a U.S. trend
toward increased concentration, particularly with the entry of mass
merchandisers into grocery retailing. Rather than waiting until the
142 See Borghesani, et al., supra note 141, at 6-30 (discussing, in detail, the emergence of
power buyers and their ability to use their market power to alter market dynamics and exercise
greater power and control over the dynamic of the procurement and consumer markets).
143 See Stephen  n.ennett, Mighty Merchandisers, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Oct, 1995, at 69 (dis-
cussing the development of Wal-Mart and other supercenters with over 200,000 square feet of
merchandising space and their entry into grocery retailing).
144 Wai-Mart total sales exceeded $100 billion in 1996, $16.7 billion of which was in grocery
sales—making Wal-Mart the third largest grocer in the United States. See Borghesani et al., supra
note 141, at 9-12; see also Wal-Mart, Data Sheet, April 1997 (on file with authors). In 1997,
Wal-Mart sales exceeded $117 billion with earnings growth "fueled by" the strong performance
of Wal-Mart supercenters. See Wal-Mart, 1998 Year-End Earnings Fact Sheet, Feb. 24, 1998 (on file
with authors); Data Sheet, Dec. 8, 1998 (on file with authors). Wal-Mart opened its first supercentcr
store in 1988 and currently operates 445 Wal-Mart supercenters. See Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Reports
February Sales, Mar. 5, 1998 (on file with authors). Ninety-seven supercenters opened in the fiscal
year ended January 31, 1998. Wal-Mart Reports Record Sales and Income for the Fourth Quarter,
Feb. 21, 1998 (on file with authors). By the year 2000, Wal-Mart expects to be "on track to be
America's largest grocer." Wal-Mart, Newsroom Press Kit, Apr. 1997 (on file with authors). Soule
reports, currently, list Wal-Mart as the second largest U.S. grocer. See Penny] Gill & Jules Alberd,
Wal-Mart: The Supply Chain Heavyweight Champ, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMY REV. 12, 18 (Spring 1997).
Wal-Mart is not alone in the foray by superccnter operators into grocery sales. See Borghesani et
al., supra, at 13.
145 The Inside Story: How Wal-Mart Buys, SUPERMARKET NEWS, May 4, 1992, at 1, 13. Wal-Mart
notes that the supercenters have been characterized "as the most powerful concept in retailing
today and position Wal-Mart as a retail leader of the future." Wal-Mart, Newsroom Press Kit, supra
note 144, Wal-Mart also boasts that its supercenters "maintain their low price structure through
aggressive buying." Wal-Mart, Newsroom Press Kit, supra.
146 See Borghesani et al., supra note 141, at 9-13; see also Matthew Schifrin, The Big Squeeze,
FORBES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 45 (discussing how first-tier and recognized brand manufacturers have
become dependent upon dominant retailers whose decisions can greatly effect their operations
and viability).
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concentration reaches monopsony levels, antitrust enforcement
authorities and lawmakers ought to take guidance from the Kesko/Tuko
decision—not to mention the realities recognized in the Toys-R- Us
decision—in their consideration and analysis of the roles of such "gate-
keeper" entities in the U.S. rnarket. 147 The lessons of the Kesko/Tuko
decision are equally applicable to the analysis of merger and growth
activities of powerful retailers.
Similarly, the role of private brands has been widely recognized in
the U.S. grocery industry as the means of increasing the bargaining
leverage of powerful retailers in their dealings with producers and
suppliers.'" Private label brands currently account for slightly less than
fifteen percent of total dollar sales in U.S. supermarkets and private
labels are the dominant brands in about twenty percent of the more
than 350 product categories that most supermarkets carry.'" Moreover,
in today's market, most national brand manufacturers think of private
labels as being just as competitive as national brands.'" Recently, one
commentator remarked that national brands have to think of private
labels differently "if for no other reason than that private label (or at
least the organization that sells it) is both competitor and customer." 15 '
Trade publications have commented on both the competitive role
that private labels play and the implications of private labels on the
"gatekeeper" role that these retailers play. One publication noted that
"when sales come at the expense of the private label, national brands
may need to tread more carefully; they could be shooting the very
horse that transports their product to the consumer."'" Industry ono-
147
 For constructing an appropriate framework for analyzing retailer power, in addition to
the Kesko/Tuko decision and the EU Green Paper, there arc a number of instructive analyses that
have been performed on this issue in the EC context. See, e.g., Paul W. Dobson & Michael
Waterson, Vertical Restraints and Competition Policy, UK Office of Fair Trading (Dec. 1996)
(Research Paper No. 12); The Public Policy Implications of Increasing Retailer Power (the
University of Nottingham School of Management and Finance) (1996) (Discussion Papers).
148 See infra notes 149-55. Traditionally, the existence of private brands has been viewed in
antitrust analysis as either benign or beneficial to competition and to consumers. In United States
v. Topco Associates, Ina, 405 U.S. 596, 599 11.3 (1972), the Supreme Court commented that "[lit
is obvious that by using private-label products, a chain can achieve significant cost economics in
purchasing, transportation, warehousing, promotion and advertising." These economics may
afford the chain opportunities for offering private-label products at lower prices that other
brand-name products. The Court, in part, recognized one aspect of the private label dynamic
which, when viewed in the context of a consolidating retail marketplace and the emergence of
dominant powerful retailers, is likely to be far from benign. As the Court noted, private label
marketing provides the advantages of "enabling a chain to bargain more favorably with national-
brand manufacturers ...." Id.
149
 Sec Hoch, supra note 141, at 89.
150 Id. at 90.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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lysts have recognized that the existence of private labels gives retailers
"extra bargaining leverage with national brand manufacturers."'"
The ability of U.S. retailers to utilize private label brands as vehi-
cles to exercise market power over the procurement market, both
from their "gatekeeper" and competitor perspective, is actual.' 54 This
exercise of market power threatens to jeopardize the survival of all but
the most prominent brand name manufacturers.'" The disappear-
ance of less prominent brand-name manufacturers would limit con-
sumer choice and create opportunities to increase consumer costs.
The application of the Kesko/Tuko analysis concerning retailers exer-
cising market power through their private labels is, accordingly, war-
ranted by the current market dynamics in the United States. This is
all the more so, given the recognized possibility that aggressive use of
this market power could result in the suppression of the procure-
ment market, with the resulting disappearance of all but the so-called
first-tier manufacturers and suppliers and the concomitant implica-
tions of these developments for the vertically interconnected consumer
market.
CONCLUSION
In rejecting the proposed merger of the Kesko and Tuko super-
market companies, the EC brought to the forefront issues concerning
the dynamic of the modern retail marketplace. Although the decision
itself was issued in the context of a proposed merger of the two largest
Finnish supermarket operations, the issues identified by the EC were
discussed in a broader context—one that transcends market bounda-
153 Ryan Mathews, flow Important Are Store Brands?, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Nov. 1995, at 79
(noting that retailers arc also positioning themselves to, and do, manufacture their own private
labels to gain both leverage and incremental manufacturing margins).
154 See Michael J. O'Connor, Power Shift, SUPERMARKET Bus., Mar. 1995, at 58 (noting that
the growth of private labels has created a "tectonic change" in the relationship between grocery
manufacturers and retailers which will likely result in the so-called "second and third brands,"
the products of small manufacturers disappearing from grocery shelves); Robert Sgarlata, How
Retailers Can Make The Most Of Private Label, CHAIN DRUG REV., Aug. 16, 1993 (noting that "the
large category-dominating retailers arc running the show," and that in the "reality of today's
retailer-driven marketplace" most suppliers cannot afford to say no to the likes of Wal-Mart and
K-Mart).
155 In Power Shift, as in the Kesko/Tuko decision, O'Connor recognizes the harsh reality that
powerful retailers' exercise of their market power creates the strong possibility that smaller
producers without countervailing market power will be eliminated. See O'Connor, supra note 154,
at 61; see also Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, supra note 5, 1 233-35
(noting, inter alia, that "products which are not in a number one or two position increasingly
run the risk of being dc-listed and replaced by large retailers' own brands").
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ries. These issues have wide-ranging implications for the manner in
which both the European Union and the United States address the
emergence of powerful and dominant retailers with the ability to
exercise market power at varying levels of the marketplace. The pre-
dominant features of emerging powerful retailers' market power in-
clude their position as "gatekeepers" to the marketplace with extraor-
dinary leverage over suppliers to the market and their dual status as
competitors and customers of these various suppliers in their capacity
as private label marketers and, in some instances, manufacturers. The
EC recognized that these new functional roles of retailers have
changed the dynamic of the marketplace dramatically.
The analysis of supermarket and other retail mergers in the
United States, under current antitrust laws and the prevailing guide-
lines, does not adequately address this emerging dynamic. While the
"gatekeeper" role creates significant potential for the exercise of mar-
ket power over consumers and competitors, interpreting U.S. antitrust
laws as protecting the consumer and, secondarily, the competitor, does
not suffice to address the emerging "gatekeeper" role of powerful
retailers at varying levels of the marketplace. Further, the Acts designed
to address the dynamic between the retailer and the supplier, notably
the Robinson-Patman and the Clayton Acts, focus primarily on protect-
ing competitors or the exercise of vertical restraints by the supplier
on the retailer. A proactive approach to these issues under the FTC
Act, Sherman Act and the merger guidelines can serve to remedy or
address the potential exercise of undue market power by the large
retailers.
The Kesko/Tuko decision reflects a new appreciation by European
antitrust authorities of the emerging reality of the retail market for
consumer goods. U.S. antitrust authorities, however, have overlooked
this appreciation outside the recent Toys-R-Us decision. This new reality
has significance not only for merger analysis, but also for antitrust
assessment of the growth of individual retailers. As powerful retailers,
large regional supermarkets and ever-emerging mass merchandisers
such as Wal-Mart, continue to exercise greater market power over their
suppliers and consumers, thereby enhancing their "gatekeeper" func-
tion, U.S. antitrust authorities will need to adopt new approaches that
are sensitive to the market. The Kesko/Tuko decision serves as an
analytical paradigm for domestic antitrust authorities to re-evaluate
their approach to these matters prospectively. Otherwise, they will be
in the position of belatedly trying to remedy the effects of powerful
retailers' exercise of market power once their "gatekeeper" functions
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and private label dominance arc further entrenched. Finally, the Kesko
/Tuko decision should also serve as motivation to assess whether fur-
ther legislative or regulatory changes arc warranted to address the
impending retail market dynamic.
